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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study (the seventh in a series)1 is designed to 
quantify-to the extent such an effort is possible-the 
ideological leanings of individual Supreme Court Justices and 
of the United States Supreme Court as a whole. As has 
generally been the case with past surveys,2 this Term's data 
reveal that the Rehnquist Court is a moderately conser-
vative-and often highly fractionated3-institution. It is also 
an institution where disputes between individual Justices over 
decisional style are becoming increasingly prominent.4 But 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University; former Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1981-84. 
** J.D. J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1994. 
*** J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 
1995. 
1 Professor Robert E. Riggs began this series with Supreme Court Voting 
Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 15 (1988). 
2 The data for the 1990 and 1991 Terms suggested possible "liberal" 
movement by various Justices on some issues. See Richard G. Wilkins et a!., 
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 1, 2 & n.2 (1992). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (disposing of a 
double jeopardy claim, the Court produced a lead opinion by Justice Scalia with 
four additional opinions-by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun 
and Souter-which concurred in the judgment but dissented in part). 
4 For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas continue their drive to limit the 
role of legislative history as an analytical tool in statutory construction. See, e.g., 
Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 2545-48 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and 
Thomas, JJ., joining opinion except the portion discussing legislative history); 
Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2006, 2012 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., joining opinion except the section discussing legislative history); Conroy 
v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1566-67 (1993) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., refusing to 
join section of opinion discussing legislative history); Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. 
Ct. 1119, 1123 (1993) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joining opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., 
except the section discussing legislative history). 
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except for the occasional rhetorical bomb,5 there were few 
major surprises in the 1992 Term. 
Although the Court's 1992 docket included several high-
profile cases with potentially far-reaching effects,6 the cases 
were ultimately decided on fairly narrow grounds.7 Indeed, the 
1992 Term may be noted more for its historical than its 
jurisprudential interest. In October 1992, Justice Clarence 
Thomas began his first full Term as an Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. The following July, Justice 
Byron White's resignation brought to a close his three decades 
of service as a member of the High Court. These two events 
mark the bounds of a Term that, despite some early predictions 
to the contrary,8 turned out to be relatively unremarkable.9 
5 Compare Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2119 n.4 (1993) (Rehnquist, 
C.J.) (asserting that Blackmun, J., in dissent, had "combin[ed] several different 
constitutional principles ... into an unrecognizable constitutional stew") with id. at 
2129-30 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's footnote "hardly 
deserves acknowledgement, let alone comment," and reasserting his adherence to 
his "derided 'constitutional stew'"). See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. 
Ct. 2742, 2750-56 (1993) (Scalia, J., writing pointed rebuttal of dissent by Souter, 
J.); Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993, 1997-98 (1993) (Scalia, J., penning 
biting critique of dissent by Stevens, J.); id. at 1999-2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(responding to Scalia, J., in kind). 
6 Religious issues originally loomed large for the 1992 Term. For example, 
some observers hoped (or feared) that the Court would take the opportunity 
provided by Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S. 
Ct. 2141 (1993), and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 
(1993), to abandon the three-part Establishment Clause test announced in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Others speculated that, in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2216 (1993), the Court 
might abandon (or narrow) the Free Exercise Clause analysis of Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
7 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 
(1993) (declining to overrule Lemon); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 
S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (affirming school district's provision of sign language interpreter 
in a parochial school without disturbing (or apparently applying) Lemon); Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (sustaining 
free exercise claim without confronting possible difficulties posed by Smith). 
8 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, With Trio of Religion Cases, High Court Term Is 
Taking Shape, WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 1992, at A7; Joan Biskupic, New Term Poses 
Test for Alliance at Center of Conservative Court: Justices Gather Amid Campaign 
that May Limit Reagan-Bush Legacy, WASH. PosT, Oct. 4, 1992, at A12; Tony 
Mauro, Seeking a Quieter Quest, RECORDER, Aug. 5, 1992, at 8; David G. Savage, 
High Court Returns to Great Uncertainty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at A10. 
9 See Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Crept to Right in '92-93 Term, 
DESERET NEWS, July 4, 1993, at A4 ("From the public perception, it was kind of a 
dull term .... "). 
This contrasts dramatically with the 1991 Term, when numerous cases received 
substantial public attention. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791 (1992) (abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (school prayer); 
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II. MODE OF ANALYSIS 
The following analysis is drawn from a tabulation of each 
Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the categories 
are based on the nature of the issues or the character of the 
parties appearing before the Court. 10 The tenth category 
(Swing Votes) tabulates the number of times each Justice voted 
with the majority in cases decided by a single vote. These 
categories are designed to demonstrate each Justice's attitude 
toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court 
decisionmaking: individual rights and judicial restraint. The 
tabulation of votes in each category, presented as Tables 1-10, 
demonstrates (in admittedly broad strokes) the frequency with 
which individual Justices and the Court as a whole vote to 
protect individual rights11 and/or exercise judicial restraint. 12 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (potential product liability 
claims against cigarette manufacturers); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 
(1992) ("hate speech"); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) 
(foreign national kidnapped by U.S. agents). 
10 Those nine categories are the following: 
1) civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or political 
subdivisions, is opposed by a private party; 
2) civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of its agencies or 
officials, is opposed by a private party; 
3) state criminal cases; 
4) federal criminal cases; 
5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech, press, association, or free 
exercise of religion; 
6) equal protection issues; 
7) statutory civil rights issues; 
8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, or related 
matters; and 
9) federalism issues. 
11 Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the 
outcome of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as 
those detailing the resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), 
the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil 
cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also involve individual rights, since these suits 
pit the government against persons asserting private rights. The federalism 
decisions outlined in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual rights 
because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. 
Nevertheless, in such cases the practical effect of voting for the state is often to 
deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon individual rights. 
12 Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-
making branches of government; adherence to precedent; avoidance of constitutional 
bases of decision when narrower grounds exist; respect for the Framers' intent 
when construing constitutional text; and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary 
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. Decisions on 
jurisdictional questions (Table 8) exhibit the relative propensity of the Justices to 
avoid unnecessary decisions. Because such judicial restraint commonly favors the 
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From the voting patterns that emerge, we attempt to 
determine whether individual Justices and the Court are 
taking "conservative" or ''liberal" positions. We classify as 
"conservative" a vote favoring the government against an 
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory 
rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote 
favoring state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism 
questions. We classify as ''liberal" all contrary votes. 13 
To the extent the above classifications accurately reflect 
ideological tendencies, trends can be identified by tracking the 
votes of the Justices and the Court in each category. Individual 
Justices' votes can readily be compared with those of other 
Justices for any given Term to reckon ideological positions 
within the Court. Determination of the current ideological 
position of the Court as a whole, however, requires comparison 
over time. For our analysis, the best available baseline is the 
comparable data generated for the five prior Terms. 14 In the 
tables this information appears in the form of percentages for 
each Justice and, in all but the Swing-Vote Table (Table 10), 
for the Court majority. 
One must interpret the data with caution, since the 
percentages are affected, not only by the behavior of the 
individual Justices, but also by the number-as well as the 
factual and legal nature---{)f the cases decided in a given Term. 
Statistical methodology, in short, may not always provide 
government over individuals, its exercise often negatively impacts individual rights. 
This occurs because judicial recognition of new individual rights usually requires 
the Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Judicial restraint 
is also traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states within the 
federal system. 
13 We are mindful of the limited utility of the "conservative" and "liberal" 
labels. As one noted federal jurist has commented: 
All that I think can be justly said about the utility of applying 
overworked labels to judges is that they are appropriate to some judges 
on some issues some of the time. But to use them as generic descriptions 
characterizing judges on supposedly major points of difference exaggerates 
the extent to which they may fairly apply. 
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE BENCH 201 (1980). 
14 Although this study has been conducted for the past seven Terms, we 
reproduce here only the data for 1992 and the prior five Terms (1987 through 
1991). We have done so to preserve the readability of the tables (more columns 
would require smaller print), and because a five-Term record seems adequate for 
comparative purposes. Data for the 1986 Term can be found in Wilkins et a!., 
supra note 2. 
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accurate indications of judicial ideology. The universe of cases 
reported on each table is not large. Furthermore, 
approximately half of the decisions during the 1992 Term were 
unanimous/5 indicating that either the law or the facts (or 
both) pointed so clearly in one direction that ideology likely did 
not play a significant decisional role. Accordingly, ideology-to 
the extent that it even can be measured statistically-may 
have played a decisive role in only about half of the cases 
decided this Term. 
As a result of small sample size and significant unanimity, 
the results of this survey may be skewed. For example, even 
though Table 6 reflects a 30-point drop in votes favoring equal 
protection claims (and, therefore, suggests significant 
conservative movement), that result may be exaggerated. Table 
6 tabulates the results of a mere five cases, and two of those 
cases were decided unanimously against the equal protection 
claim-a conservative result. Thus, some of the apparently 
significant conservative movement by the Court as a whole, 
because that movement was unanimous, may be non-
ideological. 
In addition, the facts of the decided cases often create 
characterization difficulties. A vote to uphold a greater 
percentage of criminal convictions than in a previous Term may 
mean that a Justice or the Court has become tougher on 
criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may only mean that the 
facts or the law (or both) of a number of individual cases were 
less favorable to defendants than in previous Terms. In still 
other cases, the facts may reverse the conservative/liberal 
relationship posited by this study. For example, in Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 16 the Court unanimously voted against the claim 
that the First Amendment prohibited a criminal penalty 
imposed because the defendant purposefully selected his victim 
on the grounds of race. While this vote is counted as 
conservative because it is against a First Amendment claim, 
15 See Table 1 (18 of 36 issues decided unanimously); Table 2 (16 of 33 
issues decided unanimously); Table 3 (9 of 22 issues decided unanimously); Table 4 
(7 of 16 issues decided unanimously); Table 5 (5 of 9 issues decided unanimously); 
Table 6 (2 of 5 issues decided unanimously); Table 7 (8 of 12 issues decided 
unanimously); Table 8 (18 of 24 issues decided unanimously); Table 9 (8 of 15 
issues decided unanimously). This was true not only for cases included in the 
tables but also for all cases decided during the 1992 Term. Carelli, supra note 9, 
at A4 (noting that 4 7% of the Court's cases were decided 9-0). 
16 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
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the outcome may actually represent a politically liberal desire 
to punish hate crimes. 
Because of the foregoing, our analytical scheme is far from 
perfect. One cannot be confident that percentage changes from 
one Term to another reflect a change in the ideological 
orientation of an individual Justice or of the Court majority. 
Directional changes across a number of tables, however, 
strengthen the hypothesis that a genuine shift in attitude has 
occurred. Although factual and legal variations may skew 
analysis of a given category of cases (producing unexpectedly 
liberal or conservative results), it is less likely that such factors 
would account for a pronounced directional change in several 
tables, especially over time. This is so because unusual legal 
and factual variations in discrete cases will have less impact in 
a larger statistical sample. 
Ill. THE VOTING RECORD 
With two notable exceptions, this Term's tabulations 
demonstrate broad-based conservatism on the Rehnquist Court. 
The Court was markedly conservative in its disposition of state 
criminal cases (Table 3), jurisdictional issues (Table 8) and 
federalism questions (Table 9), and a conservative coalition 
determined the outcome of a significant majority (63.6%) of 
cases decided by a single vote (Table 10). Two categories of 
cases, those involving First Amendment and equal protection 
issues (Tables 5 and 6), demonstrated some conservative 
movement, although the number of cases collected on those 
tables is too small to permit reliable generalizations. Two other 
categories, federal criminal cases and statutory civil rights 
claims (Tables 4 and 7), remained essentially unchanged from 
the 1991 Term. 
In contrast to the above indications of increasing 
conservatism are the results collected in Tables 1 and 2. In 
Table 1 (civil litigation involving state governments), the Court 
achieved its most liberal reading to date by deciding in favor of 
state governments less than half of the time: 41.7%. A similar 
trend is noted in Table 2, where the Court voted in favor of the 
federal government 66.7% of the time in the 1992 Term, down 
from 81% during the 1991 Term. These figures-drawn from 
the largest (and, therefore, perhaps the most reliable) 
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statistical samples examined in this study17-suggest that 
(despite its conservatism) the Court remains a substantial 
bulwark of individual liberty. 
Perhaps the most important trend for the Court as a whole 
revealed by the 1992 Term statistics is re-emergent control by 
conservative coalitions. Last Term, liberal coalitions-for the 
first time since the inception of this study-controlled the 
outcome of a majority (59%) of cases decided by a single vote. 
This development (among others last Term), persuaded us to 
suggest that the Court, rather than becoming increasingly 
conservative, was moving to a more moderate centrist 
position. 18 This Term's statistics, however, show a return to 
the more traditional, conservative voting patterns of the 
Rehnquist Court. This is evident not only in Table 10 (Swing 
Votes) but also in Tables 3 and 4 (State and Federal Criminal 
Cases) where-particularly in non-unanimous decisions-the 
Court demonstrated pronounced conservative movement. 
Another interesting point revealed by the 1992 Term 
statistics is the evanescence of the much-touted coalition of 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter-who played a rather 
dominant role in the outcome of controversial decisions during 
the 1991 Term. 19 Last Term, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and 
Souter were among the most influential decisionmakers on the 
Court-voting with the majority in 65% to 82% of all cases 
determined by a single vote.20 This Term, however, the 
statistics paint a different picture. 
Justice Souter, who was last Term's most influential swing 
voter, this Term ties with Justice Blackmun as the least 
influential (and relatively liberal) swing voter. 21 Justice 
Kennedy, on the other hand, shows up as a rather reliable 
member of conservative coalitions that controlled the outcome 
in 64% of the 1992 cases decided by a single vote. These figures 
(and others)22 suggest that there is considerable ideological 
17 See, e.g., Appendix B (cases included in statistical tables). 
18 Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
19 See generally id. at 7, 9. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter played a 
central role in the disposition of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992). 
20 Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 25 (Table 10). 
21 Justice Souter, this Term, voted with the governing majority in 5-4 
decisions less than one-third of the time. 
22 Justice Souter's 1992 Term record suggests that he is not terribly 
conservative. He is, in fact, grouped with the liberal wing of the Court on seven of 
the ten tables included in this study (Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10). By contrast, 
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"distance" between Justices Kennedy and Souter. The 1991 
"troika" of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter-if it 
existed at all-appears to have been exceptionally short-lived. 
One other observation from the 1992 Term is worthy of 
mention. The figures show that Justice White-often described 
as a non-ideological centrist23-ended his judicial career 
without closely aligning himself with either ideological wing of 
the Court. Grouped with conservative Justices on three 
tables24 and liberal Justices on one other,25 he stayed near 
the middle most of the time. 26 In the 1992 Term, for example, 
he moved from an extreme 1991 Term conservative record in 
Table 2 to a more centrist position. In Table 10, which reflects 
the number of times a Justice voted with the majority in cases 
decided by a single vote, Justice White is precisely in the 
middle of the pack, with four Justices voting more often with 
the majority and four Justices voting less often with the majority.27 
Justice Kennedy, who sparked the anger of many conservatives last Term with his 
vote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), returns to the 
"conservative fold" in 1992, with noteworthy conservative showings on four tables 
(Tables 1, 3, 7, 8). 
23 See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, On Greatness and Constitutional Vision: Justice 
Byron R. White, 1993 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 5, 6. 
24 Tables 1, 5, 6. 
25 Table 8. 
26 Tables 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10. 
27 Justice White's moderate voting record during the 1992 Term is reflected 
in his opinion for the Court in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). In that opinion, Justice White declined to 
explicitly reverse Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a case much maligned 
by conservative theorists, despite the apparent presence of five votes-including 
that of Justice White-to dispose of the case. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 
2149-51 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting Justice White's past disagreement with 
Lemon and chastising the Court for its failure to reverse a supposedly discredited 
precedent). Why did Justice White fail to write an opinion in Lamb's Chapel 
reversing Lemon? (Justice White's disapproval of Lemon, as noted by Justice Scalia, 
is clear.) While no definitive answer (short of a candid disclosure by Justice White 
himself) can be given, there is one exceedingly likely possibility. 
At the time he wrote his opinion in Lamb's Chapel, Justice White knew he 
would be leaving the Court. He was also aware that, while he and four other 
current members of the Court disapproved of Lemon, the case had not lost the 
support of four other Justices. Justice White, moreover, did not know whether his 
replacement on the Court would support (or criticize) Lemon. If he voted to reverse 
Lemon, Justice White would be discarding a precedent that-in the immediate 
future-might again have the support of five members of the Court. 
In such circumstances, it is quite possible that Justice White simply determined 
that he would leave the fate of Lemon up to his successor. In short, he would not 
force his personal vision upon the United States Constitution as a matter of 
individual will. If this plausible explanation for Justice White's refusal to make 
"Lemonade" in Lamb's Chapel is accurate, it is yet another indication of the 
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The above statistics confirm an early observation about 
Justice White made by Leon Friedman: 
[Justice White] approaches each case without preconceived 
ideas and with a desire to examine the individual problem in 
that case rather than deducting the result from set principles. 
His approach makes his work more difficult to analyze but it 
makes for greater justice in the cases coming before our 
highest Court.28 
We turn now to a detailed examination of individual voting 
behavior. 
Justice's careful-and laudable-decisionmaking style. 
28 Leon Friedman, Byron R. White, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 345, 356 (Leon 
Friedman ed., 1978). 
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A. Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE/LOCAL GoVERNMENT 
VERSUS PRIVATE PARTY 
1992 TERM %VOTES FOR GoVERNMENT 
VOTES 
JUSTICE 
FOR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Rehnquist 19 17 52.78 71.4 84.0 70.3 66.7 67.9 
White 18 17 51.43 59.5 64.0 59.5 55.1 53.6 
O'Connor 17 17 50.00 50.0 68.0 67.6 57.4 50.0 
Kennedy 15 21 41.67 42.9 76.0 61.1 57.1 50.0 
Scalia 15 21 41.67 64.3 64.0 64.9 59.2 51.7 
Thomas 15 21 41.67 71.4 
Souter 12 21 36.36 52.5 63.6 
Stevens 10 22 31.25 29.3 36.0 40.5 35.4 37.9 
Blackmun 10 23 30.30 35.7 24.0 43.2 30.6 44.8 
Majority 
All Cases 15 21 41.67 52.4 64.0 51.4 51.0 51.7 
Split 
Decisions 8 10 44.44 51.6 68.8 52.4 64.0 58.8 
Unanimous 7 11 38.89 54.6 55.6 50.0 50.0 37.5 
Table 1 reveals a sizeable decrease in the percentage of 
civil cases decided in favor of state governments, from 52.4% to 
41.7%. This 10.7-point drop results in the lowest percentage of 
votes in favor of state governments since this survey began29 
and continues a liberal trend that started last Term, when the 
majority of the Court voting in favor of state governments fell 
11.6 points (from 64% to 52.4%). As a result, in the 1992 Term 
the Court voted in favor of state governments only two-thirds 
as often as it did in the 1990 Term. 
The movement can be partially explained by a 15.7-point 
increase in cases decided unanimously against the states. This 
Term, unanimous decisions accounted for half (18 of 36) of all 
29 In the 1986 Term, the Court voted 53.9% of the time in favor of state 
governments. Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 8. 
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the decisions in this category. As noted earlier, unanimous de-
cisions may be weak indicators of philosophical leaning because 
the law or the facts in such cases may so clearly necessitate a 
particular outcome that ideology has limited influence. If this is 
true, the liberal 22-point drop in decisions favoring the states 
over the past two Terms may not be as significant as it first 
appears. 
An examination of several of the cases included in Table 1 
suggests that the liberal trend indeed may be somewhat over-
stated. In Soldal v. Cook County/0 the Court unanimously 
held-against the state-that the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect property interests, and not just privacy 
and liberty interests as the lower court had held. This "liberal" 
vote in favor of property rights, of course, would be warmly 
welcomed by the most conservative of jurists.31 Thus, even 
though the vote in Soldal heightened the liberal trend of Table 
1, the vote may not have been ideologically motivated.32 
In another case, dedication to an overarching philosophy of 
judicial restraint persuaded two typically conservative Justices 
to vote for a liberal result. In Harper v. Virginia Department of 
Taxation/3 the Court-by a 5-4 vote-imposed a rigid rule of 
retroactivity, concluding that the "Court's application of a rule 
of federal law to the parties before the Court requires every 
court to give retroactive effect to that decision."34 Although a 
liberal result under the assumptions of this study (because ret-
roactivity disfavored the state), the Harper outcome was 
warmly embraced by two of the Court's most conservative 
members: Justice Thomas (who wrote the majority opinion) and 
Justice Scalia (who specially concurred to condemn non-retroac-
30 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992). 
31 C{. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
(Scalia, J.) (concluding that land-use regulation depriving property owner of "all 
value" requires compensation under the Takings Clause). 
32 Indeed, the plain wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, which explicitly 
protects "property," makes the result in Soldal virtually foreordained. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XN, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law"). 
33 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993). 
34 ld. at 2513. Justices Kennedy and White would not reflexively require 
retroactive application of all new civil rules announced by the Court. ld. at 2524-26 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist would not only maintain the Court's flexibility to 
apply certain rules prospectively, they would not have applied retroactively the rule 
at issue in Harper. ld. at 2526-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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tivity as "one of the jurisprudential tools of judicial activ-
ism").35 
Soldal and Harper suggest that the liberal movement re-
flected in Table 1 should not be overstated. However, neither 
should that movement be completely ignored. Tables 1 and 2 
tabulate a larger statistical sampling of cases than the other 
tables in this study (thereby somewhat increasing their reli-
ability), and both tables indicate that the Court is increasingly 
sensitive to the claims of individuals involved in civil disputes 
with the state and federal governments. In light of the general-
ly conservative readings given by the other tables, this sensi-
tivity to individuals facing (or challenging) claims of govern-
mental authority is an important indication that (as noted last 
year) the Rehnquist Court is "not a conservative jugger-
naut."36 
Except for the overall liberal trend, Table 1 contains few 
surprises. The traditional polar positions have not changed 
since last Term. Topping the chart as the most conservative 
jurist in state civil litigation is Chief Justice Rehnquist-siding 
with the states 52.8% of the time. On the other end of the spec-
trum are Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who voted for state 
governments 31.3% and 30.3% of the time, respectively. 
Of those Justices who changed relative positions, perhaps 
the most interesting is Justice Souter. Last Term's study sug-
gested that Justice Souter was not a reliably conservative ju-
rist.37 This Term's data may add some support to that obser-
vation. In Table 1, Justice Souter is next to Justices Stevens 
and Blackmun-the most predictably liberal Justices in all of 
the tables. He is also grouped with Justices Stevens and/or 
Blackmun in Tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 and 10. Justice Souter's rela-
tively liberal ranking on seven of the ten tables in this study 
demonstrates in numerical form the emerging ideological differ-
ences between him and the conservative wing of the Court. 38 
Other interesting movements in Table 1 were made by 
Justices Thomas and Scalia. Mter occupying the first and sec-
35 Id. at 2524 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
36 Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
37 Id. at 7. 
38 See, for example, the verbal fireworks between Justices Souter and Scalia 
in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Compare id. at 2749 
n.4 (opinion of the Court, per Scalia, J.) (lambasting the "dissent's confusion-pro-
ducing analysis") with id. at 2759 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's 
"halfhearted attempt to rewrite" a prior decision). 
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ond spots, respectively, last Tenn, they dropped to a tie for the 
fourth position. Their downward movement elevated Justices 
White and O'Connor to the second and third spots, respectively. 
Justices Kennedy and Souter switched positions by virtue of 
Justice Souter's 16.2-point decrease in votes for state govern-
ments, while Justice Kennedy maintained nearly the same per-
centage as last Tenn. Incidentally, while the positions of Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor remain essentially unchanged, 
this could indicate a conservative movement on their part, giv-
en the overall liberal movement of the other Justices.39 
JUSTICE 
Rehnquist 
Kennedy 
Souter 
White 
Scalia 
Thomas 
O'Connor 
Blackmun 
Stevens 
Majority 
All Cases 
Split 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GoVERNMENT 
VERSUS PRIVATE PARTY 
1992 TERM 
VOTES 
% VOTES FOR GoVERNMENT 
FOR 
GOV'T 
23 
21 
21 
23 
21 
20 
20 
16 
11 
22 
13 
9 
AGAINST 
Gov'T 
8 
9 
9 
10 
10 
II 
12 
17 
21 
11 
7 
1992 
TERM 
74.19 
70.00 
70.00 
69.70 
67.74 
64.52 
62.50 
34.38 
66.67 
76.47 
56.25 
1991 
TERM 
71.4 
76.2 
71.4 
81.0 
71.4 
53.3 
52.4 
57.1 
57.1 
81.0 
83.3 
77.8 
1990 
TERM 
70.0 
55.6 
55.6 
70.0 
57.9 
60.0 
60.0 
40.0 
60.0 
60.0 
60.0 
1989 
TERM 
78.6 
60.7 
75.0 
60.7 
60.7 
64.3 
57.1 
71.4 
66.7 
76.9 
1988 
TERM 
71.4 
66.7 
71.4 
59.3 
60.7 
60.7 
42.9 
64.3 
66.7 
61.5 
1987 
TERM 
61.8 
58.3 
72.7 
62.5 
76.5 
50.0 
55.9 
61.8 
55.6 
68.8 
Table 2, like Table 1, demonstrates a marked decrease in 
the percentage of cases decided in favor of the government, 
39 Although Justice Stevens did not drop but rather rose 2 points, it is diffi-
cult to consider this change as indicative of a conservative shift. When unanimous 
cases are excluded from consideration, he voted for the state government on only 
three out of seventeen issues. 
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from 81% to 66. 7%. Again, as in Table 1, this decidedly liberal 
movement may be explained in part by a significant decrease 
in unanimous decisions for the government, from 77.8% to 
56.3%. It is also possible that the federal government's lower 
success rate during the 1992 Term is simply a return to "nor-
malcy" after the 1991 Term's unusual statistics. 
The federal government's lower success rate, in fact, may 
result more from its high success rate in the 1991 Term than 
any other factor. Last Term, the federal government won ap-
proximately 81% of the issues it argued before the Court-a 
very high success rate indeed (and nearly 20 points higher than 
the rate achieved in most other Terms analyzed by this study). 
The 66.7% success rate this Term may simply reflect the reali-
ty that extraordinary triumphs cannot continue indefinitely. 
There is, however, another possible reading: the 1992 Term 
statistics may indicate that the Solicitor General is not being 
adequately selective in the cases and/or arguments presented 
before the High Court.40 
Indeed, in one case last Term, two members of the Court 
went out of their way to lambast the performance of the De-
partment of Justice. In Republic National Bank v. United 
States,41 the Court unanimously rejected the government's 
claim that an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding is mooted by 
the government's liquidation of the res. Justice White, concur-
ring in the judgment, wrote separately to condemn the "trans-
parently fallacious position" taken by the Solicitor General.42 
Justice Stevens also wrote a concurring statement for the sole 
purpose of stating that he, too, was "surprised that the Govern-
ment would make such a transparently fallacious argument in 
support of its unconscionable position."43 If (as one of the au-
thors has previously argued) the Solicitor General's credibility 
with the Court is one of the federal government's most impor-
tant assets,44 the Department of Justice may wish to be some-
what more measured in future presentations to the Court. 
The ranking of individual Justices in Table 2 changes in 
only one significant respect from last Term. Justice White, who 
40 See generally Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of 
the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L. REV. 1167 (1988). 
41 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992). 
42 ld. at 563 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
43 ld. at 565 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44 Wilkins, supra note 40, at 1180-83. 
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last Term voted 81% of the time in favor of the government, 
dropped approximately 11 points (to 69.7%), and therefore 
moved from the top of the chart to the middle. The ranking of 
the other Justices in Table 2-although somewhat shuffled 
from the 1991 Term-is rather unremarkable. 
Like Justice White, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter 
reduced the number of times they voted in favor of the govern-
ment-albeit not as markedly as did Justice White. Justices 
O'Connor and Thomas, who last Term occupied the liberal 
extreme of Table 2, were displaced this Term by Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens (who returned to their accustomed 
positions as the most liberal members of the Court). 
At the other end of the table is Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who sided with the federal government 74.2% of the time. The 
Chief Justice was one of only three45 members of the Court to 
vote for the government more often this Term than last. This 
movement is noteworthy, given the overall liberal trend of the 
Court in this table. 
45 The other two were Justices O'Connor and Thomas. 
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B. Criminal Cases 
TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
1992 TERM %VOTES FOR GoVERNMENT 
VOTES 
JUSTICE 
FOR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
Gov'T Gov'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Rehnquist 18 2 90.00 66.7 81.5 85.3 85.2 73.7 
Scalia 19 3 86.36 77.8 74.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 
Thomas 18 3 85.71 75.0 
Kennedy 17 5 77.27 50.0 57.7 73.5 81.5 70.0 
White 15 5 75.00 55.6 48.1 73.5 77.8 47.4 
O'Connor 14 7 66.87 33.3 66.7 76.5 77.8 61.1 
Souter II 9 55.00 55.6 68.0 
Stevens 7 15 31.82 27.8 0.0 20.6 37.0 21.1 
Blackmun 5 15 25.00 33.3 14.8 35.3 37.0 26.3 
Majority 
All Cases 17 5 77.27 44.4 55.6 64.7 70.4 47.4 
Split 
Decisions 11 2 84.82 33.3 68.2 70.0 72.7 53.8 
Unanimous 6 3 66.67 66.7 0.0 25.0 60.0 16.7 
Table 3 displays a decisive conservative shift, from 44.4% 
of the cases being decided for the state governments during the 
1991 Term to 77.3% for the states during this Term-nearly a 
33-point shift. This increase cannot be attributed to unanimous 
cases, because in such cases the states fared no better this 
Term than last; in both Terms the states won 66.7% of the 
time. However, in non-unanimous cases, this Term the states 
won a whopping 84.6% of the time, as opposed to 33.3% of the 
time last Term. 
This Term's outcome is particularly remarkable given past 
results from this survey: during the last five Terms, the highest 
split-decision win percentage for the states was 72.7% (in the 
1988 Term). Last Term's 33.3% was the lowest win percentage 
during those five Terms. This Term's 84.6% not only returns 
the Court to its traditional spot at the conservative end of the 
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scale in this category but also establishes a new high-water 
mark for the states.46 
The Justices' relative positions in the table are not sur-
prising. Chief Justice Rehnquist regained the top spot, after 
falling to the third position last Term.47 Following close be-
hind are Justices Scalia and Thomas, voting for the states 
86.4% and 85.7% of the time, respectively. Justices Kennedy, 
White, O'Connor, and Souter follow in that order. At the liberal 
end of the scale are Justices Stevens and Blackmun, voting for 
the states a mere 31.8% and 25% of the time, respectively. 
Although the Justices' relative positions are not surprising, 
it is interesting to note that all but three of the Justices 
showed significant movement in favor of the states. This was 
most noticeable in the case of Justice O'Connor, whose voting 
percentage for the states increased from 33.3% to 66. 7%. Al-
most as significant were the increases of Justice Kennedy, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White, who increased 
their voting percentages for the states by 27.3, 23.3, and 19.4 
points, respectively. Justices Scalia and Thomas both increased 
their votes for the states by around 10 points. 
The three remaining Justices did not significantly increase 
their votes in favor of the states. While Justice Stevens did 
vote more frequently for the states this Term than last, his per-
centage of such votes rose a meager 4 points.48 Justice 
Souter's voting percentage remained essentially unchanged, 
and Justice Blackmun actually voted less often for the states 
this Term than last Term. 
46 The 1992 Term tabulation is the highest percentage of criminal cases won 
by the states since the inception of this study. (In the 1986 Term, the states won 
60.6% of all criminal cases. Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 13.) 
47 The 1991 Term was the only Term since this survey's inception that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has not led the Court in voting for the states in criminal 
cases. 
48 Although he voted for the states somewhat more often in the 1992 Term 
than did Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens is consistently the member of the 
Court least likely to vote for the states in criminal cases. In the 1990 Term, for 
example, he failed to vote for the states in a single case. 
246 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
1992 TERM % VOTES FOR GoVERNMENT 
VoTES 
JUSTICE 
FoR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
Gov'T Gov'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Rehnquist 13 3 81.25 76.9 70.0 77.8 88.9 85.7 
Thomas 13 3 81.25 54.6 
O'Connor 12 75.110 76.9 70.0 77.8 77.8 71.4 
Scalia 10 6 62.50 76.9 40.0 66.7 66.7 64.3 
Kennedy 9 6 60.110 84.6 50.0 66.7 88.9 71.4 
White 9 7 56.25 69.2 60.0 77.8 88.9 85.7 
Blackrnun 7 8 46.67 61.5 70.0 44.4 55.6 78.6 
Souter 7 9 43.75 69.2 75.0 
Stevens II 26.67 38.5 60.0 33.3 66.7 64.3 
Majority 
All Cases II 5 68.75 69.2 60.0 66.7 88.9 78.6 
Split 
Decisions 7 2 77.78 55.6 50.0 83.3 100.0 75.0 
Unanimous 57.14 100.0 75.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 
While the "Majority, All Cases" column of Table 4 remains 
essentially unchanged from last Term, analysis of the split and 
unanimous decisions reveals an underlying current similar to 
that demonstrated in Table 3: the government is winning a 
large percentage of issues decided by a split Court. This trend, 
evident in Table 3, is even more apparent in Table 4: a 43-
point decrease in the percentage of unanimous cases decided in 
favor of the federal government is partially offset by a 22.2-
point increase in the percentage of split decisions favoring the 
government. If split decisions are (as we assume) more influ-
enced by ideology than are unanimous decisions, this increase 
in split decisions favoring the federal government may indicate 
movement in a conservative direction. 49 
49 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (conservative 
five-member majority rejecting claim that forfeiture of pornographic materials vio-
lates the First Amendment). 
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As in the preceding three tables, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
once again occupies the most conservative position, although in 
Table 4 he shares that distinction with Justice Thomas. Both of 
them voted for the federal government 81.2% of the time. At 
the other extreme is Justice Stevens, who voted for the federal 
government only 26.7% of the time. The Justices at both ex-
tremes in Table 4 only voted against their respective conserva-
tive or liberal positions in unanimous cases: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas only voted against the federal 
government in three cases, all of which were decided unani-
mously; Justice Stevens only voted for the government in three 
cases, all of which were likewise decided unanimously. 5° 
The voting percentages of those Justices who fall between 
the extremes are fairly well dispersed. The Justices voted for 
the federal government in the following order and the following 
percentage of the time: O'Connor, 75%; Scalia, 62.5%; Kennedy, 
60%; White, 56.3%; Blackmun, 46. 7%; and Souter, 43.8%. 
As a final observation, it is interesting to note that, except 
for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, every Justice's 
percentage of votes for the government decreased from the 
1991 Term. Several of those decreases were substantial: Justice 
Souter dropped 25.4 points, Justice Kennedy dropped from the 
top spot to the fifth position via a 24.6-point decrease, and ev-
eryone else but Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas 
dropped between 10 and 15 points. 
50 This seems to reinforce our assertion that unanimous cases are unreliable 
indicators of ideology. If a Justice votes for one side on a consistent basis and only 
deviates from that voting pattern when the entire Court votes in unanimity, then 
it is fair to infer that unanimous cases contain few elements subject to ideological 
interpretation. 
248 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
C. Individual Rights 
TABLE 5 
CASES INVOLVING A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF EXPRESSION, 
AsSOCIATION, OR FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
JUSTICE 
Blackmun 
Stevens 
Kennedy 
Souter 
Scalia 
Thomas 
O'Connor 
Rehnquist 
White 
Majority 
All Cases 
Split 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
1992 TERM 
VOTES 
FOR 
CLAIM 
9 
9 
7 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
2 
3 
AGAINST 
CLAIM 
2 
4 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
6 
4 
2 
%VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM 
1992 1991 
TERM TERM 
90.00 88.9 
90.00 100.0 
77.78 77.8 
60.00 88.9 
45.45 37.5 
40.00 20.0 
36.36 77.8 
36.36 50.0 
36.36 50.0 
45.45 66.7 
33.33 57.1 
60.00 100.0 
1990 
TERM 
69.2 
50.0 
41.7 
41.7 
25.0 
54.5 
16.7 
15.4 
25.0 
30.0 
0.0 
1989 
TERM 
60.0 
46.7 
40.0 
26.7 
26.7 
13.3 
20.0 
40.0 
40.0 
40.0 
1988 
TERM 
41.2 
64.7 
37.5 
35.3 
25.0 
18.8 
23.5 
35.3 
22.2 
50.0 
1987 
TERM 
69.2 
50.0 
66.7 
38.5 
23.1 
16.7 
30.8 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
Table 5 reveals a shift from a liberal to a conservative 
position, with the Court finding in favor of First Amendment 
claims only 45.5% of the time, down from 66.7% during the 
1991 Term. Although this conservative movement is reflected 
in both unanimous and split decisions, perhaps the most telling 
decrease occurred in the non-unanimous cases. In those cases, 
a majority of the Court voted in favor of the First Amendment 
claim only one-third of the time. 
In fact, the conservative First Amendment results this 
Term actually may be more pronounced than Table 5 indicates. 
A number of cases involved claims based on the free exercise of 
religion; in those cases, a vote for the claim would be classified 
as liberal under this survey, even though the pro-religion out-
come would likely be viewed favorably by most conserva-
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tives.51 Thus, a number of liberal votes in this survey may ac-
tually be considered conservative by the public at large. 
But despite the foregoing, it is difficult to determine 
whether Table 5 demonstrates conservative realignment. The 
66.7% majority in favor of First Amendment claims recorded 
last Term was the highest since the inception of this 
study-and may have resulted more from the unique factual 
circumstances of the cases presented in the 1991 Term than 
from a liberal ideological shift.52 Furthermore, the conserva-
tive drop this Term merely returns the Court to a mid-point 
since this study began: the 45.5% vote in favor of First Amend-
ment claims in the 1992 Term is more liberal than three prior 
Terms (1990, 1989, 1988) and more conservative than three 
other Terms (1991, 1987, 198653). Thus, the data may reveal 
nothing more than a traditionally cautious Court continuing in 
its traditionally cautious ways. 
As for individual voting patterns, the table demonstrates 
(not unexpectedly) that Justices Blackmun and Stevens contin-
ue to be the two most liberal Justices on First Amendment 
issues. Moreover, two Justices (Kennedy and Souter) appointed 
by conservative Presidents hover relatively close to the liberal 
end of Table 5. Justice Kennedy (who seems to take special 
interest in First Amendment cases)54 comes in second place in 
Table 5,55 and Justice Souter comes in third. 
The small number of cases in Table 5, however, renders 
interpretation (or prediction) problematic. Thus, while it is 
clear that Justices Blackmun and Stevens are the most recep-
51 E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. 
Ct. 2217 (1993) (holding that municipal ordinance banning animal sacrifice violates 
Free Exercise Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding that a ban on the after-hours use of public school 
facilities to show a Christian-based film on family life constitutes unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. 
Ct. 2462 (1993) (not in Table 5 because case involves Establishment Clause claim) 
(holding that Establishment Clause does not prohibit provision of a sign-language 
interpreter in a parochial school). 
52 We noted last year, for example, that "[t]he shift may be explained, at 
least in part, by the nature of the cases reaching the Court, since every Justice 
voted for First Amendment claims more in 1991 than 1990." Wilkins et a!., supra 
note 2, at 17. 
53 For 1986 Term data, see id. at 16. 
54 During a recent visit to the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Justice Kenne-
dy, in organized discussions with faculty and students, placed special emphasis on 
First Amendment issues. 
55 Justices Blackmun and Stevens are tied for first place. 
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tive (90%) and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White the 
least receptive (36.6%) to First Amendment claims, the voting 
patterns of the individual Justices on the Court are difficult to 
forecast. 
Table 5, in fact, shows volatility (as well as possible stabili-
ty) in the voting patterns of the Justices. Justice O'Connor's 
36.7% figure is down from 77.8% last Term, while Justice 
Souter dropped from 88.9% last Term to 60% this Term. This 
movement, however, does not necessarily indicate dramatic 
ideological change on the part of either jurist. Both Justice 
O'Connor's and Souter's 1992 Term tabulations fall in the mid-
dle of their respective voting ranges: Justice O'Connor voted 
more liberally in two Terms (1991, 1990) and more conserva-
tively in three (1989, 1988, 1987) than she did in the 1992 
Term; Justice Souter voted more liberally in one Term (1991) 
and more conservatively in one Term (1990) than he did in the 
1992 Term. Thus, it is not clear whether Justices O'Connor and 
Souter are, in fact, becoming more conservative on First 
Amendment issues. 
As for the remaining members of the Court, Justice Kenne-
dy remained virtually unchanged from last Term. Justice 
Thomas, for his part, actually increased his percentage in favor 
of First Amendment claims by 20 points. Any prediction of 
growing First Amendment liberalism on the part of Justice 
Thomas based on two Terms' data, however, would be prema-
ture. 
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JUSTICE 
Blackmun 
O'Connor 
Souter 
Stevens 
Kennedy 
Rehnquist 
Scalia 
Thomas 
White 
Majority 
All Cases 
Split 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
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TABLE 6 
CASES INVOLVING AN EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE 
1992 TERM 
VOTES 
% VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM 
FOR 
CLAIM 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
AGAINST 
CLAIM 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
2 
2 
1992 
TERM 
40.00 
40.00 
40.00 
40.00 
20.00 
20.00 
20.00 
20.00 
0.00 
20.00 
33.33 
0.00 
1991 
TERM 
50.0 
33.3 
50.0 
66.7 
50.0 
50.0 
33.3 
60.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
1990 
TERM 
83.3 
28.6 
50.0 
83.3 
42.9 
14.3 
14.3 
42.9 
42.9 
50.0 
33.3 
1989 
TERM 
0.0 
25.0 
0.0 
25.0 
20.0 
25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1988 
TERM 
60.0 
66.7 
66.7 
57.1 
57.1 
57.1 
66.7 
57.1 
100.0 
50.0 
251 
1987 
TERM 
50.0 
12.5 
28.6 
33.3 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
0.0 
20.0 
Table 6 shows a 30-point shift in a conservative direction, 
but the significance of this shift may well be negligible. Only 
five equal protection issues were decided during the 1992 
Term. Two of these issues were decided unanimously against 
the claim. 56 The three remaining issues-disposed of in two 
sharply divided 5-4 opinions57-constitute a rather small uni-
56 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993) (applying 
rational basis scrutiny to reject an equal protection challenge to cable television 
regulation); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (reversing district court's 
finding of an equal protection violation and remanding for further proceedings). 
Although the question in Beach Communications (i.e., whether some form of 
"heightened" scrutiny applies to economic regulations) was disposed of by a unan-
imous vote against the claim (a conservative outcome), a vote in favor of such an 
argument would almost certainly have been opposed by liberal jurists as a "regret-
table" step toward Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that majority's invalidation of zoning regulation under the guise of 
"rational basis" equal protection scrutiny is a "small and regrettable step back 
toward the days of [Lochner]"). 
57 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (five-member majority concluding 
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verse from which to draw any meaningful conclusions. Never-
theless, the ranking of the Justices appears to be in line with 
what one might expect. 
TABLE 7 
CASES INVOLVING A STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE 
1992 TERM % VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM 
VOTES 
JUSTICE 
FOR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Stevens 7 3 70.00 88.9 80.0 77.8 73.7 87.5 
Blackmun 7 4 83.64 88.9 80.0 88.9 80.0 87.5 
o·connor 6 5 54.55 55.6 53.3 55.6 52.6 42.9 
White 5 50.00 66.7 53.3 88.9 55.0 62.5 
Scalia 5 6 45.45 44.4 46.7 55.6 40.0 57.1 
Souter 5 6 45.45 44.4 57.1 
Thomas 5 6 45.45 28.6 
Kennedy 4 7 38.38 55.6 33.3 62.5 45.0 66.7 
Rehnquist 4 7 38.38 44.4 33.3 44.4 35.0 37.5 
Majority 
All Cases68 6 6 50.00 55.6 53.3 88.9 50.0 75.0 
Split 
Decisions 2 50.00 40.0 33.3 83.3 25.0 60.0 
Unanimous 50.00 75.0 83.3 100.0 87.5 100.0 
that plaintiffs state an equal protection claim by alleging that a reapportionment 
scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to 
segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 
113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (five-member majority refusing to consider claim that stat-
ute classifying on the basis of mental disability is subject to heightened equal 
protection scrutiny; five-member majority concluding that differences between com-
mitment proceedings for mentally retarded and mentally ill individuals are ratio-
nally related to legitimate state objectives and, therefore, pass equal protection 
scrutiny). 
58 It may at first appear that the numbers in this table do not add up, due 
to the fact that the total number of issues decided is 12, while no Justice's num-
bers add up to more than 11. This is because every Justice failed to decide at 
least one of the issues decided by the Court. Justices Stevens and White failed to 
decide two issues. 
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The overall outcome of Table 7 remains relatively un-
changed from the 1991 Term, with votes for the claim down by 
5 points. This conservative movement is too small to be consid-
ered significant, particularly in light of the cases included in 
Table 7. Of the outcomes tabulated in Table 7, only four were 
non-unanimous, and those were split evenly for and against the 
claims. On such a record, any claim of ideological movement (in 
either a conservative or a liberal direction) appears unfounded. 
Justice Stevens leads the way in this table, voting for the 
claim 70% of the time. Justice Blackmun follows, voting for the 
claim 63.6% of the time. Both of these Justices, although re-
maining at the top of the chart, have dropped somewhat from 
88.9% in the 1991 Term. At the bottom of the table are Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, who both voted for the 
claim only 36.4% of the time. For Justice Kennedy this repre-
sents a drop of 19.2 points, from the fourth position in the 1991 
Term. Immediately above those Justices are Justices Scalia, 
Souter and Thomas, who all voted for the claim 44.5% of the 
time. The final two Justices, O'Connor and White, round out 
the table, voting for the claim 54.6% and 50% of the time, re-
spectively. 
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D. Jurisdiction and Justiciability Questions 
TABLE 8 
CASES INVOLVING A JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE 
1992 TERM %VOTES FOR JURISDICTION 
VOTES 
JUSTICE 
FOR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
JURIS. JURIS. TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Stevens 23 10 69.70 75.0 91.4 68.0 73.0 57.1 
Blackmun 22 II 66.67 71.4 80.0 79.2 64.9 58.1 
White 20 13 60.61 69.0 63.9 68.0 62.2 51.2 
Souter 18 14 56.25 75.0 57.6 
Rehnquist 18 15 54.55 62.1 54.3 60.0 51.4 47.9 
Thomas 18 15 54.55 66.7 
O'Connor 17 15 53.13 63.3 54.3 68.0 51.4 42.9 
Kennedy 17 16 51.52 73.3 58.3 64.0 51.4 56.3 
Scalia 17 16 51.52 55.2 48.5 60.0 50.0 36.6 
Majority 
All Cases 18 16 52.94 73.3 63.9 64.0 62.2 55.8 
Split 
Decisions 6 10 37.50 69.2 38.9 33.0 62.5 71.4 
Unanimous 12 6 66.67 76.5 88.9 81.3 61.9 48.3 
Table 8 demonstrates a significant shift in favor of judicial 
restraint. While the Court voted to exercise jurisdiction in 
73.3% of the instances in which the issue was raised last Term, 
this Term a significantly more conservative approach held 
sway: the Court voted to assert jurisdiction over a claim of non-
jurisdiction approximately half of the time, 52.9%. This 20-
point decrease is reflected in both unanimous and split deci-
sions, with the former dropping 9.8 points and the latter 31.7 
points. A 31.7-point drop in the outcome of split decisions is 
particularly telling if (as we assume) such decisions are often 
influenced by ideology. 
But while the Court as an institution appears to have 
become somewhat more conservative on jurisdictional andjusti-
ciability issues, the ideological leanings of individual Justices 
on these issues is unclear. A conservative vote in favor of judi-
cial restraint may mask an underlying liberal objective. Indeed, 
on several occasions a liberal dissent written during the 1992 
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Term invoked conservative principles of judicial restraint to 
avoid a conservative result announced by the majority.59 As a 
result, Table 8 may be a weak predictor of the future conduct of 
the Court on jurisdictional and justiciability questions. 
Furthermore, Table 8 does not strongly indicate the proba-
ble future courses of individual Justices. While the ranking of 
the Justices in Table 8 seems to accord generally with what 
one might expect (i.e., that Justices Stevens and Blackmun are 
the most liberal, and that Justice Scalia is the most conserva-
tive), the distance between polar extremes is only 18.2 points. 
Within that range, the Justices' vote totals often differ by only 
a single vote. This makes it difficult to confirm with any cer-
tainty the ideological leanings of individual Justices. With such 
a compact grouping, it is also difficult to say whether or not an 
individual Justice is "out of place," since a single vote might 
have moved a Justice above or below another Justice. 
With the above caveats in mind, the rankings of the indi-
vidual Justices (with the possible exceptions of Justices Kenne-
dy and Souter) are not surprising. Justices Stevens and 
Blackmun again take the liberal lead, upholding the jurisdic-
tional claim in 69.7% and 66.7% of the cases, respectively. At 
the bottom of the table are Justices Kennedy and Scalia, both 
voting to uphold jurisdiction little more than half of the time, 
51.5%. Justice Kennedy's ranking in Table 8, however, is some-
what unexpected, due to the fact that he arrived at that spot 
via a 21.8-point drop from last Term, when he occupied the 
second most liberal position. Another interesting drop is that of 
Justice Souter, who fell from the top liberal position last Term 
to fourth place this Term, a decrease of 22.8 points. 
59 E.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2470 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that principles of constitutional avoidance impel 
the Court to consider whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act bars 
the provision of a sign-language interpreter in parochial schools); Northeastern Fla. 
Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. 
Ct. 2297, 2305 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because case was 
moot, majority should not have reached the standing of plaintiffs to challenge a 
minority set-aside provision). 
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JUSTICE 
O'Connor 
Rehnquist 
Thomas 
White 
Kennedy 
Scalia 
Souter 
Stevens 
Blackrnun 
Majority 
All Cases 
Split 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
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E. Federalism Issues 
TABLE 9 
CASES INVOLVING A FEDERALISM ISSUE 
1992 TERM 
VOTES 
%VOTES FOR STATE CLAIM 
FOR 
STATE 
11 
11 
10 
10 
9 
9 
9 
9 
8 
10 
4 
6 
FOR 
U.S. 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
5 
3 
2 
1992 
TERM 
73.33 
73.33 
66.67 
66.67 
60.00 
60.00 
60.00 
60.00 
53.33 
66.67 
57.14 
75.00 
1991 
TERM 
39.1 
43.5 
35.0 
30.4 
26.1 
26.1 
36.4 
31.8 
43.5 
26.1 
28.6 
22.2 
1990 
TERM 
71.4 
71.4 
57.1 
71.4 
71.4 
83.3 
28.6 
14.3 
71.4 
80.0 
50.0 
1989 
TERM 
56 .• ~ 
56.3 
43.8 
56.3 
56.3 
43.8 
43.8 
43.8 
25.0 
50.0 
1988 
TERM 
73.7 
81.0 
63.6 
72.7 
76.2 
57.1 
40.9 
59.1 
50.0 
70.0 
1987 
TERM 
33.3 
46.2 
30.8 
33.3 
30.8 
46.2 
46.2 
38.5 
33.3 
42.9 
Table 9 deals with questions raised by conflicts between 
federal and state governmental authority. 60 In examining 
these Issues, we assume that conservative Justices tend to 
favor state authority, while liberal Justices tend to support fed-
eral authority. This Term, Table 9 presents a dramatic shift to 
the right, with the Court deciding for the state governments 
66.7% of the time, as compared to only 26.1% in the 1991 
Term.61 
This dramatic shift, however, probably results more from 
the range of issues encountered during the Term than from any 
60 See Appendix A for a more detailed statement of the criteria for inclusion 
in this category. 
61 This sizeable shift is evident in the statistics for both split and unani-
mous decisions. In split decisions, the Court ruled for the state government 57.1% 
of the time, up from 28.6% last Term. In unanimous decisions, the Court ruled for 
the states 75% of the time, up from 22.2% last Term. 
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ideological reorientation by the Justices. In past surveys, the 
results in this category have fluctuated rather wildly from 
Term to Term-on both an individual and a collective level. 
Thus, last Term's precipitous decline and this Term's dramatic 
upswing in cases decided in favor of state authority may not be 
extraordinary. 
On an individual level, the two Justices who headed this 
table last Term now find themselves at opposite extremes: 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun tied for first 
place last Term, voting for the states 43.5% of the time. This 
Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist still occupies the top spot (now 
joined by Justice O'Connor), voting for the states 73.3% of the 
time, but Justice Blackmun falls all the way to the bottom spot, 
voting for the states 53.3% of the time. The other Justices, 
falling between those extremes, are separated from one another 
by only single votes. 
As in Table 8, the distance between the polar extremes in 
this table is small, only 20 points, and that 20-point spread is 
made up of three votes. Therefore, it is difficult to find signifi-
cance in the relative position of any single Justice. Were it 
otherwise, Table 9 might suggest at least one unusual align-
ment: Justice Scalia, a predictably conservative vote, and Jus-
tice Stevens, a predictably liberal vote, share the same per-
centage of votes for the states. If based on a larger (and, there-
fore, more reliable) statistical sample, this voting pattern might 
be worth significant mention. Because of the thin data upon 
which it is based, however, this relatively anomalous ranking is 
unlikely to signal a turning of the judicial tides. 
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F. Swing-Vote Analysis 
TABLE 10 
CASES INVOLVING A SWING-VOTE ISSUE 
1992 TERM VOTES %VOTES WITH MAJORITY 
JUSTICE 
FOR AGAINST 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 
MAJ. MAJ. TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM 
Scalia 18 81.82 35.3 52.2 66.7 73.5 66.7 
Kennedy 16 6 72.73 64.7 52.2 71.4 82.4 71.4 
Rehnquist 16 6 72.73 41.2 69.6 66.7 76.5 70.0 
Thomas 16 6 72.73 23.5 
White 12 10 54.55 64.7 60.9 78.6 76.5 77.4 
O'Connor 9 13 40.91 58.8 69.6 69.0 76.5 64.5 
Stevens 9 13 40.91 58.8 47.8 42.9 26.5 61.3 
Blackrnun 7 15 31.82 70.6 47.8 33.3 38.2 45.2 
Souter 7 15 31.82 82.4 59.1 
Conservative 
Coalition 14 8 63.64 41.2 54.5 64.3 76.5 64.5 
Liberal 
Coalition 8 14 36.36 58.8 45.5 35.7 23.5 35.5 
We identified twenty-two swing-vote decisions for the 1992 
Term. In these cases, the shift of a single Justice from a major-
ity to a minority coalition would create a new majority and a 
different result. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because it 
identifies members of the Court who most frequently shift or 
"swing" from one voting coalition to another in order to form 
majorities. Because each vote is crucial to the outcome of a case 
decided by a single vote, swing voting is an important index of 
ideological influence on Court decisionmaking. In the 1992 
Term, the swing-vote table suggests a significant resurgence of 
conservative influence on the Court. 
This Term, a conservative coalition62 was victorious 63.6% 
62 When classifying a coalition as either conservative or liberal, we looked to 
(1) the traditional ideological leanings of the Justices who constituted the coalition; 
and (2) the ideological result of the case as defined by traditional notions of "liber-
al" and "conservative," rather than the definitions used throughout the rest of this 
survey. 
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of the time in swing-vote decisions. This is in contrast to last 
Term's victory rate of 41.2%. The ranking of individual Justices 
in Table 10 is consistent with this overall increase in conserva-
tive decisions. Justice Scalia, often publicly perceived as the 
most conservative member of the Court, was the most influen-
tial swing voter during the 1992 Term, siding with the majority 
81.8% of the time. 63 Tied as the second most influential group 
of swing voters is the trio of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas, all of whom voted with the major-
ity 72.7% of the time. Justice White rounds out the conserva-
tive quorum, siding with the majority 54.6% of the time. 
Justices O'Connor and Stevens mark the boundary be-
tween the conservative coalition and the liberal coalition, siding 
with the majority 40.9% of the time. Rounding out the group, 
Justice Souter sided with the majority only 31.8% of the time, 
the same frequency as Justice Blackmun. 
The above figures suggest that-at least in cases with 
ideological overtones-Justices O'Connor and Souter (although 
nominal conservatives at the time of their appointments) are 
now quite likely to cast liberal votes. The emergence of Justices 
O'Connor and Souter as liberal forces on the Court was noted 
last Term.64 But unlike last Term, the liberal movement of 
these two Justices has not had a significant impact on the 
outcome of cases actually decided by the Court. This may be 
because, as reflected in Table 10, Justice Kennedy-who joined 
For example, in Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993), the five-member 
majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas 
and White. Based on these Justices' traditional ideological leanings, we would clas-
sify this coalition as conservative. That classification is further supported by the 
outcome of the case-a decision favoring the state in a criminal case-an outcome 
usually considered conservative. 
Another example is Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), in which the five-
member majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. Again, these Justices would traditionally be classi-
fied as conservative. But under the definitions used in this survey, the decision 
would be considered liberal-the majority voted against the state and federal gov-
ernments, and in favor of an equal protection claim. However, an examination of 
the actual outcome of the case-the Court allowed an equal protection challenge by 
several white plaintiffs to a state reapportionment statute that created a geograph-
ically bizarre majority-black district--reveals an outcome that would actually be 
considered conservative by most commentators. Therefore, under our swing-vote 
approach, the five-member majority would again be classified as a conservative 
coalition. 
63 Justice Scalia's 1992 Term rate of 81.8% contrasts sharply with his 31.3% 
rate last Term. 
64 Wilkins et al., supra note 2, at 26. 
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with Justices O'Connor and Souter last Term65-has taken a 
rather different (and conservative) turn this Term. 
Justice Souter, who last Term exercised the most influence 
in swing-vote cases, this Term tied with Justice Blackmun as 
the member of the Court exercising the least influence in 
swing-vote outcomes. Likewise, with the exception of Justices 
Kennedy and White (who have maintained influential positions 
throughout both Terms),66 all of the Justices seemed to fill 
roles inverse to their roles in the 1991 Term.67 Justice 
Kennedy's perseverance among the influential Justices, in light 
of the conservative dominance this Term, seems to indicate a 
conservative shift on his part. 68 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mter a possible liberal flirtation in voting patterns last 
Term, 1992 Term voting patterns returned to the conservative 
trends noted during the first five years of this study. The 
Rehnquist Court remains conservative on criminal law issues, 
is hesitant to broadly expand the reach of the First Amend-
65 ld. 
66 Justice White remained an influential swing voter during the 1992 Term. 
See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (conservative five-
member majority, including Justice White, rejecting claim that forfeiture of por-
nographic materials violates the First Amendment); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 
892 (1993) (conservative five-member majority, in an opinion written by Justice 
White, precluding habeas corpus challenge to death penalty conviction because the 
challenge was based on a "new rule"); Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 579 (1993) 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing five-member ma-
jority opinion for independently determining the "reasonableness" of an attorney's 
fee award). 
67 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, 
dominated the outcome of swing-vote cases this Term, although they influenced far 
less than a majority of such cases in the 1991 Term. Similarly, Justices O'Connor, 
Stevens, Blackmun and Souter-who last Term controlled the outcome of from 
58.8% to 82.4% of the swing-vote cases-this Term joined with a swing-vote majori-
ty in 40% of the cases or less. 
68 That conservative ideology indeed played a significant role in the 1992 
Term's 5-4 decisions-and that Justice Kennedy played an important role in such 
cases-is demonstrated rather dramatically by Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health 
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). There a bare majority of the Court (consisting essen-
tially of the dissenters in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), 
plus Justice Kennedy), concluded that anti-abortion animus is not "class based" 
and, therefore, is not reachable under 28 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The case-virtually 
crammed with ideological baggage-reached a conservative (i.e., anti--civil rights) 
result because Justice Kennedy (who joined with the Bray dissenters last Term to 
produce the majority result in Casey) waffled yet again, this time in a conservative 
direction. 
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ment, is increasingly cautious in its exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion, defers to state authority on federalism issues, and (in the 
majority of instances) is controlled by conservative voting coali-
tions in closely divided cases. But despite these trends, the 
Court decides the majority of civil claims against state govern-
ments and is much less receptive than in the recent past to the 
positions of the federal government in civil cases. 
One might expect the 1992 Term patterns to continue into 
the 1993 Term. However, the 1993 Term probably will not 
reflect the 1992 Term because Ruth Bader Ginsburg has re-
placed Byron White. To the extent that Justice Ginsburg is less 
of a centrist than was Justice White, the 1993 Term may pro-
vide some surprises.69 Justice Ginsburg may be more likely 
than Justice White to vote with the liberal wing of the Court 
on closely divided cases. If so, the control exercised by conser-
vative coalitions over the swing-vote decisions (Table 10) could 
evaporate. Justices Blackmun and Souter (who this Term exer-
cised the least influence in closely divided cases) would again 
be elevated to positions of decisional prominence, while Justice 
Scalia (who this Term most often cast the deciding vote in the 
majority of cases decided by one vote) would fall to the bottom 
of the scale. 
69 However, for a preliminary evaluation suggesting that Justice Ginsburg's 
impact may be minimal, see James J. Kilpatrick, Ginsburg? She'll Throw No 
Bombs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 24, 1993, at BlO. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPLANATION OF CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 
AND CLASSIFICATION OF CASES 
1. The Universe of Cases 
[Volume 8 
Only cases decided during the 1992 Term by a full opinion set-
ting forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Decisions 
on motions are excluded, even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases 
handled by summary disposition are included if accompanied by a full 
opinion of the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases 
decided by a 4-4 vote, hence resulting in affirmance without written 
opinion, are excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions are con-
sidered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunc-
tory manner. Cases not fitting within any of the first nine categories 
are, of course, not included in the database for any of the tables. This 
is true even if a case was decided by a 5-4 vote; if the case does not 
fit within any of the first nine categories, it will not be counted as a 
swing-vote case. 
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal 
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly 
understood definitions; generally, the nature of the case is clearly 
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in the 1992 Term raised such a ques-
tion. 
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Tables 1 Through 4 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental 
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily 
true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if 
they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be 
the government itself, one of its agencies or officials, or, with respect 
to state government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit against 
an official in her personal capacity is included if she is represented by 
government attorneys or if the interests of the government are other-
wise clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is 
excluded if governmental entities appear on both sides of the contro-
versy. If both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit 
on the same side, with only private parties on the other, then the 
case is included in both Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than 
once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting 
the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different vot-
ing alignments. 
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4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Tables 5 Through 9 
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 for 
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opin-
ion(s). One case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is 
also included more than once in the same table if it raises two or 
more distinct issues in that category affecting the disposition of the 
case, and if the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A 
case is not included for any issue which, though raised by one of the 
litigants, is not addressed in any opinion. 
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues 
poses no special problem. In each instance, the nature of the claim is 
expressly identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, 
association, and free exercise of religion are included. Establishment 
Clause issues are excluded, however, because one party's claim of 
religious establishment is often arrayed against another party's claim 
of free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue 
of individual rights. 
Cases included in Table 7, involving statutory civil rights issues, 
are limited to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and the civil 
rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right 
asserted is based on a federal statute or if the issue is the application 
of§ 1983-that is, whether or how that section's protections apply to 
the case at hand. However, § 1983 actions are excluded if the sub-
stantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution 
and the issue relates to the constitutional right. The purpose of the 
§ 1983 exclusion is to preserve a distinction between constitutional 
and non-constitutional claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not 
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions 
are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member 
of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may 
comment on its jurisdiction. 
Table 9 (federalism issues) is limited to issues raised by conflict-
ing actions of federal and state or local governments. Common exam-
ples are preemption, intergovernmental immunity, application of the 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on action by the federal 
government, and federal court interference with state court activities 
(other than review of state court decisions). Issues of ''horizontal" 
federalism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the 
dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
are excluded from the table. 
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5. The Swing-Vote Cases-Table 10 
Table 10 includes all cases in which the outcome turns on a 
single vote. This category also includes 4-3 decisions, if any, as well 
as 5-3 and 4-2 decisions resulting in reversal of a lower court deci-
sion. Affirmances by a vote of 5-3 or 4-2 are not included because a 
shift of one vote from the majority to the minority position would still 
result in affirmance by a tie vote. A case is included more than once 
in the table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the dispo-
sition of the case and the issues are resolved by different 5-4 (4-3, 
etc.) voting alignments. 
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APPENDIX B 
CASES INCLUDED IN STATISTICAL TABLES 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State/Local Government Versus Private Party 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unani-
mous) 
Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors, 113 S. Ct. 1190 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993) (Unanimous) 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) 
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562 (1993) (Unanimous) 
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 
(1992) 
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) 
El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 113 S. Ct. 2004 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) (2 issues; 2 unanimousf0 
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (2 issues) 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (3 issues; 
2 unanimous) 
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (4 issues; 1 unanimous) 
Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) 
Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993) 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 
2141 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. 
v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unani-
mous) 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993) 
(Unanimous) 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. 
Ct. 684 (1993) 
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716 (1993) 
70 Under our analysis, a case is included more than once in the same table 
if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the 
issues are resolved by different voting alignments. We have considered an issue as 
resolved by a unanimous vote if it was decided without written dissent, regardless 
of the number of Justices who expressly decided the issue. Therefore, a case rais-
ing two distinct issues could have those issues resolved by two different voting 
alignments (e.g., 9-0 and 7-0), both of which would be considered unanimous. 
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Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) 
Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992) (Unanimous) 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993) 
[Volume 8 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) 
Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government Versus Private Party 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, 113 S. Ct. 692 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Bufferd v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 927 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Church of Scientology v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 447 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 113 S. Ct. 1898 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993) 
Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2006 (1993) 
Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539 (1993) (Unanimous) 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993) (Unani-
mous) 
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151 (1993) 
Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035 (1993) 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024 (1993) (Unanimous) 
McNeil v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1980 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) 
Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unanimous) 
Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993) (3 issues; 1 
unanimous) 
Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) 
Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) 
Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unanimous) 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) 
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993) 
United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993) 
(Unanimous) 
United States by & through Internal Revenue Serv. v. McDermott, 
113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993) 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (2 
issues) 
United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 
S. Ct. 2173 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Hill, 113 S. Ct. 941 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) 
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Table 3: State Criminal Cases 
Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993) 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unanimous) 
Delo v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993) (2 issues) 
Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Fex v. Michigan, 113 S. Ct. 1085 (1993) 
Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993) 
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) 
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993) 
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) 
Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993) 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993) 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (2 issues; 2 unani-
mous) 
Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992) 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 17 45 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unanimous) 
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases 
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (3 issues; 1 unan-
imous) 
Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993 (1993) 
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) 
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993) 
Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (3 issues) 
United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993) 
United States v. Nachtigal, 113 S. Ct. 1072 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Zafiro v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Table 5: Cases Involving a First Amendment Right of Expression, 
Association, or Free Exercise of Religion 
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (2 issues) 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993) (Unanimous) 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) 
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) 
El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 113 S. Ct. 2004 (1993) (Unanimous) 
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Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 
2141 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716 (1993) (Unani-
mous) 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (2 
issues) 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Table 6: Cases Involving an Equal Protection Issue 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993) (Unani-
mous) 
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (2 issues) 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Table 7: Cases Involving a Statutory Civil Rights Issue 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (2 
issues; 1 unanimous) 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unani-
mous) 
Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) (2 issues; 2 unanimous) 
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (Unanimous) 
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) 
Table 8: Cases Involving a Jurisdictional Issue 
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2167 (1993) 
(Unanimous) 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (2 
issues; 1 unanimous) 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unani-
mous) 
Cardinal Chern. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 113 S. Ct. 1967 (1993) (2 issues; 
1 unanimous) 
Church of Scientology v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 447 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539 (1993) (Unanimous) 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993) (Unani-
mous) 
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993) 
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) (Unanimous) 
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) 
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) 
Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2035 (1993) 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024 (1993) (Unanimous) 
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Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 113 S. Ct. 2252 
(1993) 
McNeil v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1980 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 549 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. 
v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993) (2 issues; 1 unani-
mous) 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. 
Ct. 684 (1993) 
Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993) (2 issues; 1 
unanimous) 
Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992) (Unani-
mous) 
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (3 issues) 
United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 113 
S. Ct. 2173 (1993) (Unanimous) 
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) 
Table 9: Cases Involving a Federalism Issue 
Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors, 113 S. Ct. 1190 (1993) (Unanimous) 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993) (2 issues; 1 
unanimous) 
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 
(1992) 
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Harper v. Virginia Dep't ofTaxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) 
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) 
Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993) 
Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992) (Unanimous) 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 113 S. 
Ct. 684 (1993) 
United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993) (2 
issues; 1 unanimous) 
United States v. Idaho ex rei. Director, 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993) (Unan-
imous) 
United States v. California, 113 S. Ct. 1784 (1993) (Unanimous) 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (Unanimous) 
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Table 10: Cases Involving a Swing-Vote Issue 
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) 
[Volume 8 
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (2 
issues) 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) 
Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) 
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993) 
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) 
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) 
Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993) 
Newmark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 
(1993) 
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) 
Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485 (1993) 
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S. Ct. 716 (1993) 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) 
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) 
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (2 issues) 
United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993) 
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) 
